Insurance - Joinder of Liability Insurers - No-Action Clauses in Policies Written Outside the Local Jurisdiction by McCarrier, John T.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 20
Issue 3 April 1936 Article 6
Insurance - Joinder of Liability Insurers - No-Action
Clauses in Policies Written Outside the Local
Jurisdiction
John T. McCarrier
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
John T. McCarrier, Insurance - Joinder of Liability Insurers - No-Action Clauses in Policies Written Outside the Local Jurisdiction, 20 Marq.
L. Rev. 158 (1936).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol20/iss3/6
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
195 Wis. 131, 132, 217 N.W. 645 (1928). But the court has definitely decided that
"release of security" is still available as a defense to an accommodation co-
maker. State Bank of LaCrosse v. Michel, 152 Wis. 88, 139 N.W. 748, 1131
(1913). That "payment" by the principal debtor-mortgagor to the holder-assignee
does not "discharge" the debt so as to prevent recourse against a sub-grantee
who has assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage indebtedness, see Mueller v.
Jagerson Fuel Co., supra.
Subrogation as between the accommodating party and the creditor is not
literally affected by any prescription in the Negotiable Instruments Law. Nor
do the courts generally hold that the act has had that effect. O'Neal v. Stuart,
281 Fed. 715 (C.C.A. 6th, 1922); Clifford v. West Hartford Creamery Co., 103
Vt. 229, 153 Atl. 205 (1931); Wakonda State Bank v. Fairfield, 53 S.D. 268, 220
N.W. 515 (1928). The Kansas court refused to permit an accommodating party
to reach collateral security in the hands of the creditor so long as the creditor
himself was claiming a security interest in the collateral to cover some other
separate indebtedness, a security interest for which the creditor had literally
bargained. Spire v. Spire, 104 Kan. 500, 180 Pac. 209 (1919). Even that decision,
isolated as it is, does not justify the assertion that that an accommodating co-
maker is not entitled to subrogation. Payment by a volunteer obviously gives the
payor no right to subrogation at the expense of any other possible interested
person. See Bank of Baraboo v. Prothero, 215 Wis. 552, 558, 255 N.W. 126
(1934). But the wife in the principal case was no volunteer; she had an interest
to protect when she made the payment.
In the principal case it is probably true that the court felt the record justi-
fied the classifying of the $15,000 deal as an associated transaction with the
previous extension of credit. The wife in all probability knew about the account
between her husband and the bank. If that were true the decision is under-
standable. The dissenting opinion, however, calls attention to the fact that the
bank was not claiming to hold the mortgage lien to secure the balance still
owing, and the minority felt that the bank thereby had waived its claim to make
this out to be an associated transaction.
INSURANCE-JOINDER OF LIABILITY INSURERs-No-ACrION CLAUSES IN POLI-
CIES WRITTEN OUTSIDE THE LOCAL JURISDIcTIN.-An automobile insurance policy
covering the insured defendant's automobile was written and issued in Illinois
to a resident thereof upon an automobile kept, licensed, and usually operated
therein. The policy contained a clause to the effect that no action shall lie against
the insurer until the amount of the damage is determined by final judgment or
agreement. The plaintiff sued the defendant upon an accident in Wisconsin and
joined the insurance company under authority of Section 260.11 of the Wiscon-
sin Statutes of 1933. The insurance company filed a plea in abatement which
was overruled in the trial court. On appeal, held, judgment reversed; the trial
court should have sustained the plea because the statute did not apply to the
case. Ryerly v. Thorpe (Wis. 1936), 265 N.W. 76.
In Wisconsin, the permissive joinder statute (WIs. STAT. (1935) § 260.11],
making an insurer a proper party defendant in any action brought against an
insured under a policy to recover damages caused by the latter's negligent opera-
tion of an automobile, is effective as against a no action clause in the policy.
Lang v. Baumann, 213 Wis. 258, 251 N.W. 461 (1933); Oertel v. Fidelity and
Casualty Co., 214 Wis. 68, 251 N.W. 465 (1933). But it is effective only against
those policies entered into subsequent to the adoption of the statute. It is not
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retroactive in application to policies written previous to that date. Pawlowski v.
Eskofski, 209 Wis. 189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932) ; Baker v. Tormey, 209 Wis. 627,
245 N.W. 652 (1932). Legislation permitting direct joinder of the insurer has
been held to invalidate no action clauses in many jurisdictions. Globe Indemnity
Company v. Martin, 214 Ala. 646, 108 So. 761 (1926); Ruiz v. Clancey, 182 La.
935, 162 So. 734 (1935) ; Lunt v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 261 Mass. 469,
159 N.E. 461 (1927) ; Stacey v. Fidelity and C. Co., 114 Ohio State 633, 151 N.E.
718 (1926). The case at issue must be distinguished from Sheehan v. Lewi,
218 Wis. 588, 260 N.W. 633 (1935), where the no action clause was held
unenforceable, the policy being written by a Massachusetts insurance company
protecting a Wisconsin corporation. The court said that the statute shall govern
and render the conflicting provisions inoperative. The interpretation of a per-
sonal contract is referable to the place where it was made. International Harves-
ter Co. v. McAdam, 142 Wis. 114, 124 N.W. 1042 (1910) ; McKnelley v. Brother-
hood of American Yeomen, 160 Wis. 514, 152 N.W. 169 (1915). An insurance
policy made in and to be performed in Wisconsin by non-residents is to be
governed in its validity and effect by the laws of Wisconsin. North Western
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Adams, 155 Wis. 335, 144 N.W. 1108 (1914). The pro-
visions or laws of the state where the contract is made will be recognized in
other jurisdictions unless against the statutes, powers, rights, or the well settled
public policy of the other jurisdiction. Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v.
Lovelace, 1 Ga. App. 446, 58 S.E. 93 (1907). It was held in Clarey v. Union Cen-
tral Life Insurance Co., 143 Ky. 540, 136 S.W. 1014, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 763, (1911)
that a no action clause as to the period within which to bring a suit would be
recognized in another state though contrary to its public policy.
The no action clause in a liability insurance policy secures a valuable
right, Pawlowski v. Eskofski, supra. To disregard the provision is to place upon
the insurer a greater obligation than that contracted for, and results in an
impairment of the contract between the parties, contrary to Section 10, Article
I of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitu-
tion of Wisconsin. One of the tests that a contract has been impaired is that
its value has by legislation been diminished. Planters Bank v. Sharp, 6 Howard
(U.S.) 301, 12 L.ed. 447 (1848); Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S. 126, 41
Sup. Ct. 408, 65 L.ed. 857 (1920). If the effect of impairment is produced, it is
immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy or directly on the contract
itself. Pawlowski v. Eskofski, supra. In the case at issue, the court determined
that, as the no action clause would be valid in Illinois, the insurer is entitled to
the rights thereunder, and to permit joinder of the insurer would be unconstitu-
tional as an impairment of a contract. In a case directly in point and with
identical facts, Riding v. Travelers Insurance Company, 48 R.I. 483, 138 Atl. 186
(1927), the court held that the insurer's obligation under the policy was not
variable or dependent upon the jurisdiction in which the insured drove his car.
JOHN T. McCAmumR
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S CoPENsATioN-ARISING OUT OF AND IN
THE COURSE OF EmPLOYMENT.-The claimant is the widow of the deceased. She
made claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act against
the deceased's employer. The deceased was killed while he was returning from
a week-end trip at his lake home. He was on his way to assume his duties as
salesman for the defendant company. The claimant contended, and proof sus-
tained her claim, that deceased frequently made stops on return trips to deliver
batteries and car accessories to his employer's customers. She failed to substan-
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